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Abstract: 
The main premise of the neoclassical theory is built on the idea that markets have inherent self-
adjusting mechanisms and that everything that facilitates ‘free’ markets should be the ultimate aim 
of policy making. The neoclassical theory claims that the theoretical pedigree of this proposition can 
be found in Adam Smith. Contrary to this neoclassical claim, this review provides evidence that Smith 
has been very careful to draw the attention to the failures of the egoistic pursuit of profit and to 
highlight the dangers of unhindered operation of a ‘free market’ system and reviews his conscious 
attempts to highlight that the private interest and the social interest are not always compatible. 
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Mirage and Reality; Reflections on the Neoclassical Interpretation of Adam Smith’s Intellectual 
Heritage 
 
1. Introduction 
In the darkest days of the Great Depression Keynes was hopeful that   
"the day is not far off when… the economic problem may be solved ... This means that the economic 
problem is not… the permanent problem of the human race... it should be a matter for specialists – like 
dentistry. If economists could manage to get themselves thought of as humble, competent people, on 
the level with dentists, that would be splendid!’1 
Contrary to Keynes’ hopes almost 90 years after the above lines were written the ‘economic problem’ 
is not solved and economists have failed to remedy the inability of the economic system to generate 
a persistently fully employed economy. Instead the current economic wisdom guided by the prevailing 
‘individualism’ and the ‘free markets’ neoclassical paradigm has failed not only to alleviate the 
enormous anomalies of unemployment and poverty but it has promoted gross inequalities of income 
and wealth unseen in the historical record.  
For almost 50 years the neoclassical theoretical discourse in economics and the imposed ‘free market’ 
economic policies have seized the theoretical and policy discourse in academia, media and 
government as the Holy Inquisition had seized Spain. The main premises of the neoclassical edifice are 
built around the idea that markets have inherent self-adjusting mechanisms. Therefore, the state and 
the democratically elected governments should simply play a caretaker role since the self-regulating 
free markets can maximise human welfare only if they are left in to their own devices. A corollary of 
this is that if the democratically elected government actively attempts to regulate the ‘markets’ this 
should be expected to be detrimental to their functioning. Furthermore, such regulation limits 
individual choice since the ability of consumers to buy and sell whatever they consider as best serving 
their needs and promoting their goals is a "component of freedom properly understood"2. 
Consequently, the neoclassical view is that regulation of markets via any government action is 
equivalent to limiting individual freedom. Hence, the role of government should be limited to 
safeguarding law and order, enforcing private property and contracts, and providing for the common 
                                                            
1 Keynes J. M. (1930) Economic Possibilities for our Grandchildren 
2 Milton Friedman (1962), Capitalism and Freedom, University of Chicago Press, p8. 
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defence and a common monetary and banking system which should be also independent from the 
government interference or regulation.  
Importantly, in the neoclassical theory the main motive of any economic or social activity is the pursuit 
of ‘profit’ by individuals in an independent and egoistic fashion. The unhindered functioning of the 
markets is heralded as ensuring that everyone earns what everyone deserves. Those who employ 
capital and labour in the right way are expected to eventually obliterate through the unfettered 
competition those who have followed the wrong path. There is no mercy or protection for those who 
either through weakness or misfortune are the losers in this cut-throat competition. In the ruthless 
battle for survival only the most successful survive to witness the bankruptcy of those less so. The 
neoclassical theory proposes that in this process the benefit of the outcome is what matters and there 
is no need for any reckoning for the cost of the cut-throat competition or any factoring out of the 
initial ownership or the initial endowment of the productive resources. Hence, the neoclassical view 
is that there should be no concern if profit ensues to the individual who, whether by talent or good 
luck, is found endowed with the productive resources at the right time in the right place.  
In view of the above, the neoclassical theory and policy suggests that everything that facilitates ‘free’ 
markets should be the ultimate aim of policy making. This should be implemented in four main 
directions: first, complete deregulation of labour, financial and product markets, second, unmitigated 
mobility of labour and capital, third, elimination of any provision of public good including abolition of 
the provision of social insurance and any publicly financed safety net and, four complete privatisation 
of any assets in the public domain.  Actions or institutions that may diminish the market flexibility 
including government restrictions on finance and capital, labour market regulation, and trade union 
activity should be banished.  Furthermore, antipoverty policies and progressive taxation are 
counterproductive and therefore should be both avoided and discouraged outright. In this respect, it 
is interesting that contrary to the neoclassical belief of freedom for the pursuit of profit, the freedom 
of labour to organise in trade unions and pursue its interests through collective bargaining is 
considered as impinging free market functioning and as hindering the creation of wealth. 
In the neoclassical economic discourse, inequality, an outcome of the concentration of wealth to the 
few, is considered a reward for the productivity of the individual and a generator of wealth in line with 
the neoclassical theory of incentives without due consideration to the observation that profit ensues 
to the individual endowed with the initial productive resources. Furthermore, the theory maintains 
that the unequally distributed wealth at the top somehow trickles down to enrich all citizens. A 
corollary of this is that redistribution of wealth through progressive taxation should be considered to 
be both counterproductive and morally destructive. To the contrary, mainly for the wealthy, taxes are 
4 
should be minimised since lower taxes are deemed to promote investment, effort and employment 
and, importantly, this reduction of tax revenue constrains the financial ability of the government to 
interfere in the self-regulating mechanisms of the ‘free markets’ by, for instance, providing public 
services.  
The neoclassical theorists claim their theoretical pedigree in the writings of Adam Smith and the liberal 
philosophers of the seventeenth and eighteenth century, yet the ‘free market’ doctrine cannot be 
found in its neoclassical dogmatic form in the writings of Adam Smith. Contrary to the neoclassical 
theorising, as it will be discussed in the next section, in his writings Smith has been very careful to 
draw the attention to the failures of the egoistic pursuit of profit and to highlight the dangers of 
unhindered operation of a ‘free market’ system. Importantly, he has made a conscious attempt to 
highlight that the private interest and the social interest are not always compatible.  
2. The origins of the ‘Free Market’ Neoclassical Thought. 
Individualism and the free market ideology has had a long history in the development of the economic 
discourse. As Keynes has observed3, it has its roots in the clash between those who defended the 
natural liberty of the individual against the divine right of the monarchs, the aristocracy and the 
church. The seventeenth century thinkers such as John Locke and David Hume have developed an 
intellectual framework that regarded the free individual as the central element of the social structure. 
Therefore, the rights of the individual with regards to life, liberty, and property are considered to be 
the fundamental principles of this framework ensuring that the individual had the freedom to enjoy 
his or her wealth and possessions. For instance, Locke proposes that “the great and chief end…of 
men’s uniting into commonwealths, and putting themselves under government is the preservation of 
their property”4.   
In Locke’s framework individual natural rights and a limited government are established but the extent 
of the latter is crucially dependent upon the consent of the governed. Indeed, most fundamentally 
the continuation of the government depends on the right of people to overthrow rulers who fail to 
uphold their end of the ‘social contract’. Thus, the government is perceived to be morally obliged to 
serve the people and to rest its authority on the consent of the governed in order to protect the 
individuals’ natural rights of life, liberty, and property and facilitate the advancement of individual 
interests. Furthermore, Locke establishes the individual’s right to own property and he defines the 
right to property for both the land that the individual cultivates and the goods that the individual 
                                                            
3 The End of Laissez Faire 
4 Princeton Readings in Political Thought, Second Treatise of Government, p. 262 
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produces. Importantly, Locke rationalises land rent as a return for labour expended in improving the 
land, but he does not justify unearned income -that is economic ‘rent’ - for what the nature offers 
freely. Thus, he proposes a distinction regarding labour expended between the common and the 
private as in the case of one picking fruits in owned cultivated property as “labour put a distinction 
between them (fruits) and common: that added something to them more than nature, the common 
mother of all, had done; and so they became his private right.”5  
In France, Rousseau brought to fore the rights of the society, contrary to the perceived social 
dominance of individual rights cherished by Locke.  Rousseau used the Social Contract to advance the 
case of freedom through the “general will”. He argues that “private interest tends always to 
preferences, the public interest to equality” 6 but the public interest which is reflected in the “general 
will is always right and always tends toward the public utility.”7. Hence, Rousseau advances the 
argument that “each of us puts his person and all his power in common under the supreme direction 
of the general will” 8. The ‘general will’ is “only the common interest,” in contrast to the “will of all,” 
which Rousseau considers to be the “sum of private wills.” In effect, Rousseau argued that the sum of 
private wills – the sum of private interests- does not necessarily reflect the common interest of the 
society- the general will.   
Following a different path Jeremy Bentham defended the rights of the society by using Hume’s 
principle of "greatest happiness principle" or "the principle of utility". However, contrary to Hume 
views, he not only considers the individual utility of possessions or actions, but also, he advances the 
idea that the morally essential issue is the extent to which these possessions or actions promote the 
general happiness defined as the greatest happiness for the greatest number of people.  Therefore, 
whatever action or possession does not maximize the greatest happiness is morally wrong even if it 
promotes narrowly defined individual interests. 
In view of the above there appears to be a dichotomy between private and social rights: how can the 
individualism proposed by Locke and Hume be compatible with the utilitarian ideal and equality of 
Bentham and Rousseau? In reviewing the development of the Laissez-faire free market ideology, 
Keynes 9 has pointed out that this difficulty of harmonisation of private interests with the interests of 
the society, the provision of public goods, social equality and justice could occur only if the Divine 
                                                            
5 Princeton Readings in Political Though, Second Treatise of Government, p. 251 
6 On the Social Contract, ed. Roger Masters and trans. Judith Masters (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1978). Book II, chapter one, page 59 
7 Princeton Readings in Political Though, On The Social Contract, p. 284 
8 Princeton Readings in Political Though, On The Social Contract, p. 282 
9 ‘The End of Laissez Faire’ 
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harmony prevails, or if a civil authority interferes. Indeed, Rousseau has recognised this contradiction 
and has found the solution in suggesting that if someone does not abide by “the general will” then 
one must be “forced to be free”.  
In Keynes view it was Adam Smith who gave a philosophical resolution to the above conundrum 
without resorting either to Divine harmony or to civil authority compulsion. Smith hypothesises that 
if individuals by pursuing their own interests under conditions of freedom can also uphold the public 
interest then the philosophical puzzle can be resolved at least in practice.  Hence individuals can 
concentrate in pursuing their own interests in conditions of freedom.  
3. Smith’s Intellectual Heritage  
The simplicity of the theoretical structure advanced by Adam Smith in Wealth of Nations comes from 
his governing principle of the ‘natural liberty’ along the lines defined by Locke which allows ‘every man 
to pursue his own interest his own way, upon the liberal plan of equality, liberty and justice’10. In this 
framework and under certain conditions Smith argues that  
‘The annual revenue of every society is always precisely equal to the exchangeable value of the whole 
annual produce of its industry, or rather is precisely the same thing with that exchangeable value11. As 
every individual, therefore, endeavours as much as he can both to employ his capital in the support of 
domestic industry, and so to direct that industry that its produce may be of the greatest value, every 
individual necessarily labours to render the annual revenue of the society as great as he can. He 
generally, indeed, neither intends to promote the public interest, nor knows how much he is promoting 
it. By preferring the support of domestic to that of foreign industry, he intends only his own security; 
and by directing that industry in such a manner as its produce may be of the greatest value, he intends 
only his own gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end 
which was no part of his intention… By pursuing his own interest, he frequently promotes that of the 
society more effectually than when he really intends to promote it.’12.  
In advancing this conjecture Smith brings about the harmonisation of private interests with the 
interests of the society as a natural outcome of the pursuit of private interest in in conditions of free 
exchange. Smith proceeds with a similar conjecture to propose that the ideal distribution of 
productive resources can also be brought about in a process of ‘trickling down’ of wealth. Thus, he 
                                                            
10 WN I V.ix.3. 
11 Smith’s version of what it is now known as the Say’s Law, one of the pillars of the neoliberal economic theory. 
12 An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, Book IV, Chapter II, par.  IX,   IV.2.9 
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argues a selfish landlord acting independently is able to distribute his harvest to those who work for 
him without concern for the public interest -again as being led by an invisible hand: 
‘It is to no purpose, that the proud and unfeeling landlord views his extensive fields, and without a 
thought for the wants of his brethren, in imagination consumes himself the whole harvest that grows 
upon them…The capacity of his stomach bears no proportion to the immensity of his desires, and will 
receive no more than that of the meanest peasant. The rest he is obliged to distribute among those, 
who prepare…that little which he himself makes use of…; all of whom thus derive from his luxury and 
caprice, that share of the necessaries of life, which they would in vain have expected from his humanity 
or his justice. The produce of the soil maintains at all times nearly that number of inhabitants which it 
is capable of maintaining. The rich only select from the heap what is most precious and agreeable. 
They consume little more than the poor, and in spite of their natural selfishness and rapacity… they 
divide with the poor the produce of all their improvements. They are led by an invisible hand to make 
nearly the same distribution of the necessaries of life, which would have been made, had the earth 
been divided into equal portions among all its inhabitants, and thus without intending it, without 
knowing it, advance the interest of the society, and afford means to the multiplication of the species… 
In ease of body and peace of mind, all the different ranks of life are nearly upon a level, and the beggar, 
who suns himself by the side of the highway, possesses that security which kings are fighting for’13.  
Along the above lines, through using the principle of the ‘free market’ principle, Smith is able to 
harmonise the conflict of egoistic individualism and public interest. By pursuing his own private profit, 
the master entrepreneur can attain this harmonisation in terms of production of goods and services, 
which results first, in generation of income sufficient to buy the produced goods and services and 
second, in the distribution of this income among the members of the community in an equitable and 
just way.  
The historical record of uninspiring, incompetent and riddled by corruption public governance for 
most of the 18th century has strongly biased the public’s views in favour of the of the above ‘free 
markets’ ideal. Almost everything that the State did above its minimum function has been perceived 
to be either harmful or ineffective. In short, in Smith’s time the ‘invisible hand’ outlined above 
provided the main route through which, the political economy has found a pretext by which the 
contradiction between the egoistic individuals pursuing their own advancement and the societal 
interest without the government interference could be solved. It is an outcome of the philosophical 
discourse at the end of the era of feudalism and the decay of the established governance of the day. 
                                                            
13 The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759) in Part IV, Chapter 1, Par. 10. 
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Notwithstanding this historical record Smith has been accurate to observe that ‘civil government, so 
far as it is instituted for the security of property, is in reality instituted for the defence of the rich against 
the poor, or of those who have some property against those who have none at all’14. 
However, there is no doubt that the straightforwardness and simplicity of the theoretical structure 
advanced by Adam Smith in Wealth of Nations is appealing, yet, it is clear that it follows not from facts 
but from his own conjectures. Adam Smith is very much aware of the failings of the ‘invisible hand’ 
and the shortcomings of his conjecture that wealth is freely ‘trickling’ down to the whole of society. 
Smith’s views which are elaborated in his main corpus of work are undogmatic regarding his own 
conjectures and a far cry from the contemporary neoclassical general equilibrium paradigms in a 
perfect-competition economy in an institution-free world. 
Contrary to the contemporary neoclassical thinking, Smith is very much concerned by the cost and 
character of the competitive struggle and the tendency of wealth to be distributed towards where 
wealth is. Smith is critical of the ‘merchants and manufacturers’ who in the pursuit of their gain are 
drawn to foreign markets without regard to their own country. He points out that  
‘What all the violence of the feudal institutions could never have affected, the silent and insensible 
operation of foreign commerce and manufactures gradually brought about… All for ourselves, and 
nothing for other people, seems, in every age of the world, to have been the vile maxim of the masters 
of mankind. As soon as they can find a method of consuming the whole value of their rents themselves, 
they had no disposition to share them with any other persons’ 15 
Importantly, he does not overlook the sufferings of those less well-endowed in the battle for survival. 
Far from been indifferent for the human cost and suffering generated by the workings of the economic 
mechanisms that he is conjecturing he argues that 
‘Servants, labourers and workmen of different kinds, make up the far greater part of every great 
political society. But what improves the circumstances of the greater part can never be regarded as an 
inconveniency to the whole. No society can surely be flourishing and happy, of which the far greater 
part of the members are poor and miserable. It is but equity, besides, that they who feed, cloath and 
lodge the whole body of the people, should have such a share of the produce of their own labour as to 
be themselves tolerably well fed, cloathed and lodged’16.  
                                                            
14 Chapter I, Part II, 775 
15 Book III, Ch. IV, p. 205 
16 Book I, Chapter VIII. 
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Rather than only looking at only for the benefit of the result of the ‘free markets’ principle accruing to 
the successful profit makers, he both counts for the cost of the struggle in this ruthless battle for 
survival and advocates the need of government action for protection of the interests of those less 
fortunate or less well-endowed in the society. He draws attention to the fact that    
‘In the progress of the division of labour, the employment of the far greater part of those who live by 
labour, that is, of the great body of the people, comes to be confined to a few very simple operations, 
frequently to one or two… The man whose whole life is spent in performing a few simple 
operations…[h]e generally becomes as stupid and ignorant as it is possible for a human creature to 
become. The torpor of his mind renders him… incapable… of conceiving any generous, noble, or tender 
sentiment, and consequently of forming any just judgment concerning many even of the ordinary 
duties of private life… But in every improved and civilized society this is the state into which the 
labouring poor, that is, the great body of the people, must necessarily fall, unless government takes 
some pains to prevent it17.’ 
Furthermore, Smith does not only propose strongly government protective action for those less 
fortunate but, contrary to the neoclassical policy doctrines of tax breaks to the wealthy, he advances 
the view that the state should obtain resources by progressive taxation and then use these resources 
to attend to the needs of the weaker members of the society since: 
‘The necessaries of life occasion the great expense of the poor. They find it difficult to get food, and the 
greater part of their little revenue is spent in getting it. The luxuries and vanities of life occasion the 
principal expense of the rich, and a magnificent house embellishes and sets off to the best advantage 
all the other luxuries and vanities which they possess. A tax upon house-rents, therefore, would in 
general fall heaviest upon the rich; and in this sort of inequality there would not, perhaps, be anything 
very unreasonable. It is not very unreasonable that the rich should contribute to the public expense, 
not only in proportion to their revenue, but something more than in that proportion’18. 
Contrary to the neoclassical view that there is no need for any concern regarding the tendency of the 
unhindered ‘free markets’ to promote a concentration of ownership of the productive resources that, 
in turn, enhances the concentration of political power, Smith expresses clearly his concerns regarding 
the political power of the organised interests. He draws attention to the preoccupation of vested 
interests of wealth and privilege in extracting unearned income that is economic ‘rent’. This is 
probably the reason for his strong advocacy for a land tax. He argues that:  
                                                            
17 Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations, Book V, Chapter 1, Part III 
18 Chapter II, Part II, Article I, p. 911. 
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‘as soon as the land of any country has all become private property, the landlords, like all other men, 
love to reap where they never sowed, and demand a rent even for its natural produce. The wood of the 
forest, the grass of the field, and all the natural fruits of the earth, which, when land was in common, 
cost the labourer only the trouble of gathering them, come, even to him, to have an additional price 
fixed upon them.’19  
In view of this, he clearly highlights the harmful societal effects of wealth accumulation based on 
hereditary ownership and he opposed the view that land ownership rights should prevail since 
‘they are founded upon the most absurd of all suppositions, the supposition that every successive 
generation of men have not an equal right to earth and to all that it possesses; but that the property 
of the present generation should be restrained and regulated according to the fancy of those who died, 
perhaps five hundred years ago’20.  
Importantly, Smith is very well aware of the vulnerability of public interest to the vested interests of 
the ‘merchants and manufacturers’ and he does not look favourably the institutionalised facilitation 
of their gatherings. He points out to another consequence of individualism and ‘free markets’ 
unhindered functioning namely corruption, conspiracy and insider dealing organised by those with 
vested interests by suggesting that ‘merchants and manufacturers’ frequently conspire against the 
interest of the public in their quest for monopoly power since 
‘People of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and diversion, but the 
conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in some contrivance to raise prices. It is 
impossible indeed to prevent such meetings, by any law which either could be executed, or would be 
consistent with liberty and justice. But though the law cannot hinder people of the same trade from 
sometimes assembling together, it ought to do nothing to facilitate such assemblies; much less to 
render them necessary.21  
In view of the above Smith proposes that governments should defend the public interest from 
monopoly power and economic misbehaviour spawned from the above ‘conspiracy against the public’ 
by the ‘merchants and manufacturers’. He argues that this should be done by governments by putting 
in place appropriate regulations to ensure that the interests of society are attended to. He strongly 
argues that: 
                                                            
19 W of N, book I, ch 6, par 8, p60 . 
20 ch 10, par 55. 
21 book 1, ch 10, 82 
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‘exertions of the natural liberty of a few individuals, which might endanger the security of the whole 
society, are, and ought to be, restrained by the laws of all governments; of the most free, as well of the 
most despotical. The obligation of building party walls, in order to prevent the communication of fire, 
is a violation of natural liberty, exactly of the same kind with the regulations of the banking trade which 
here proposed’22.  
Though Smith refers specifically to the banking sector his views naturally apply to other instances of 
economic misbehaviour. In relation to issues of economic misbehaviour Smith is also suspicious of the 
activities of what in today’s terminology is knowing as lobbying that serves vested financial and 
commercial interests.  Thus, he draws attention to the outcome of monopoly power on the legislature 
since  
‘the cruellest of our revenue laws…are mild and gentle, in comparison of some of those which the 
clamour of our merchants and manufactures has extorted from the legislature, for the support of their 
own absurd and oppressive monopolies’23 
Furthermore, Smith suggests that governments should defend the public interest by carefully and 
rigorously scrutinising any proposals regarding laws and regulations recommended by vested 
interests. This is a far cry from the current practice in regulatory authorities where vested financial 
and commercial interests become members or chairs of the regulatory committees. Thus, Smith 
argues that: 
‘The proposal of any new law or regulation of commerce which comes from this order, ought always 
to be listened to with great precaution, and ought never to be adopted till after having been long and 
carefully examined, not only with the most scrupulous, but with the most suspicious attention. It comes 
from an order of men, whose interest is never exactly the same with that of the public, who have 
generally an interest to deceive and even to oppress the public, and who accordingly have, upon many 
occasions, both deceived and oppressed it."24 
In this respect, he argues that the contrivers of the whole trade system of his day is the monopoly 
power imposed on the legislature by merchants and manufacturers since 
‘It cannot be very difficult to determine who have been the contrivers of this whole mercantile system; 
not the consumers… but the producers, whose interest has been so carefully attended to;…  our 
                                                            
22 W of N, Book II, Ch2, par 94 
23 Book IV, Chapter VIII, Conclusion of the Mercantile System p. 822 
24 Chapter XI, Part III, Conclusion of the Chapter, p. 292 
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merchants and manufactures have been the principal architects... [whose interest] has been most 
peculiarly attended to’ 25. 
Furthermore, Smith is aware of the crucial contribution of public goods and utilities to the society. 
Contrary to the neoclassical policy recommendations favouring wholesale privatisation of public 
assets, Smith views state assets such as ports, water, canals, the hospitals and the universities as 
entities, which are not supposed to operate for profit but rather to establish an infrastructure in the 
country conducive to providing a stable and low cost environment for all citizens and the business 
world, within which they could pursue their interests. He proposes that 
“The duty of the sovereign or commonwealth is that of erecting and maintaining those public 
institutions and those public works, which, though they may be in the highest degree advantageous to 
a great society, are, however, of such a nature that the profit could never repay the expense to any 
individual or small number of individuals, and which it therefore cannot be expected that any individual 
or small number of individuals should erect or maintain. The expense of maintaining good roads and 
communications is, no doubt, beneficial to the whole society, and may, therefore, without any injustice 
be defrayed by the general contribution of the whole society”26 
Thus, public investment and ownership is viewed by Smith as minimising the economy’s cost structure 
and protecting the citizens and business alike from rent-extracting that privatised monopolies build 
into the price of public goods. Instead of privatising public services and permitting monopolies to 
install implicit or explicit tollbooths for rent extraction, Smith voices his view that  
 ‘The tolls for the maintenance of a high road, cannot with any safety be made the property of private 
persons’27. 
4. Conclusions; Smith’s reality and the neoclassical mirage 
The above review highlights that contrary to Smith’s views and concerns about the operations of the 
‘free markets’ the neoclassical theorists hypothesise that the individual has unaccountable ‘natural 
liberty’ in their economic activities and that ‘free markets’ and the unconstrained pursuit of profit 
provides an unfailing mechanism that maximises both individual and societal welfare. As a result, over 
the last two centuries the principles of individualism and ‘free markets’ secured a lasting hold over the 
                                                            
25 Book IV, Chapter VIII, Conclusion of the Mercantile System p. 841 
26 A. Smith (1776) An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, Book V. 
27 Chapter I, Part III, Article I, p. 786 
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affairs of public policy in a manner that, in some form or another, ignores or downplays the above 
concerns of the political and moral philosophy of Smith.  
In doing so, the neoclassical theorists assume that the world is so made that private and social 
interests always coincide and that enlightened self-interest always operates in the public interest.  
Furthermore, contrary to Smith’s anxieties but also contrary to overwhelming theoretical and 
experimental evidence of modern psychology providing undisputed evidence that self-interest is 
generally not enlightened and more often than not individuals are too ignorant or too weak to act 
even in attaining their own interest28, the contemporary ‘free market’ theorist assume that the 
master-individualist entrepreneur serves the society by serving stringently his or her own self-interest.  
In addition, ‘free market’ theorists act as if market prices reflect the true value of the product or 
service at any time –thus assuming no deception, conspiracy (in Smith’s terminology) or fraud in the 
process. Governments following the neoclassical policy prescriptions have launched a wide attack on 
the functions of the state which Smith considered vital for a well-functioning society. In particular, 
governments have engaged themselves in a wholesale privatisation of public services including vital 
industries such as water, energy, transport, roads, health, education and prisons. As most of these 
industries are natural monopolies this has enabled the acquiring monopolists to ‘conspire against the 
public’ and to charge the highest price that the market can bear for every essential public asset or 
service thus extracting a monopoly rent for the use of these valuable and socially necessary services29.  
In view of the above one should assume that the lasting hold of the neoclassical views on current 
public affairs is not simply an outcome of the intellectual discourse or the accumulation of historical 
experience and evidence justifying the theoretical presuppositions but an outcome of the fact that 
the neoclassical doctrine conforms with the wishes and needs of the of the moneyed and economically 
privileged elites rather than to the principles of Smith’s 18th century liberalism. Though the 
neoclassical doctrine has been heralded as the bastion of Smith’s economic thinking it largely and 
purposefully disregards Smith’s important reservations regarding the possible failures of his 
theoretical conjectures and his advice for defending the public interest through appropriate ‘firewalls’. 
This impedes the ability of the democratic governments to act towards remedial actions that can 
ensure the achievement of a ‘flourishing and happy’ society as envisioned by Smith. 
                                                            
28 The questioning of the validity of the neoclassical assumptions are well documented in the area of research in economics as a 
combination of economics and psychology 
29 This rent extracted by monopolists, in the neoclassical discourse is thought to be return to capital and effort investment instead to 
concern the production of tangible consumption or investment goods and services concern the acquisition of public assets through 
privatisation. In effect, the ensuing rentier income is redefined as return to investment. 
14 
The outcome of the long period that the neoclassical policies have ruled over the public affairs is that, 
contrary to Keynes predictions quoted above and notwithstanding the enormous progress in science 
and technology the same ‘giant evils’ of ‘want, disease, ignorance, squalor, and idleness’ identified by 
William Beveridge that haunted Keynes’ contemporaries are still causing an immense human distress 
to large sections of the population not only of the developing world but to a substantial extent of the 
developed economies though the latter enjoy tremendous technological advancements.  
  
15 
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